This paper examines which economic, institutional and political characteristics of countries affect the likelihood that a numeral rule will be adopted as part of a fiscal strategy to limit the level of public debt. We estimate a panel binary response model over the period 1970-2012 for 110 countries, of which 58 opted to adopt such a rule. Our results suggest that the probability such a rule will be adopted is greater if a country has a high level of public debt, a relatively inflexible exchange rate regime, has already adopted inflation targeting, has deep credit markets and if other countries already have adopted a debt rule. There are some differences in decision factors between high-income and lower income countries, with the level of economic development and the openness of the economy playing opposite roles in each country group, and the impact of monetary unions on debt rule adoption being much stronger in the former group. The results are robust to testing for reverse causality, including using different econometric techniques.
INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1990s, an increasing number of countries have adopted numerical rules that aim at constraining fiscal policy decisions. For example, the International Monetary Fund (2009) estimates that by the end of 2009, 80 countries had adopted national and supranational numerical fiscal rules to guide fiscal policy. The empirical evidence on the gains from adopting fiscal rules is mixed. Several papers offer supporting results with respect to postadoption fiscal performance, including that targeting the budget balance or general government debt can have a significant and sizeable impact on limiting fiscal deficits (Debrun et al., 2008) ; that expenditure rules can be effective in restraining primary spending (Deroose et al., 2008; European Commission, 2007) , including by limiting upward pressure on expenditure due to unexpected revenue windfalls (Wierts, 2007) ; that their impact is more favourable if rules have a strong legal and institutional basis and are enforced strictly (von Hagen et al., 2005; European Commission, 2007; Wierts, 2007; Dabla-Norris et al., 2010) ; and that rules can contribute to successful fiscal consolidation (European Commission, 2007; Guichard et al., 2007) . However, other studies report that significant breaks in fiscal performance * Manuscript received 6.10.14; final version received 19.8.15. 2015 doi: 10.1111/manc.12136 appear to have preceded the adoption of fiscal rules (Caceres et al., 2010) and that there appears to have been no improvement in the fiscal performance of emerging market economies that adopted fiscal rules compared with those economies that did not (Thornton, 2009) . Also, there are several operational problems that complicate the effective implementation of fiscal rules. In particular, the rules need to be flexible enough to accommodate unforeseeable situations that may arise that would make any rule too costly to respect (e.g. in the context of the cumulative increases in public debt in many highincome economies following the 2007 financial crisis); they can often be manipulated (e.g. in estimating the cyclical correction inherent in any rule to balance the budget over the business cycle); they can be subject to arbitrage when, as is common practice, more than one fiscal rule is adopted; and they may not be effective unless they are complemented by a strong political commitment or by domestic budgetary institutions (von Hagen et al., 2005; Wyplosz, 2013) .
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Given that the returns from adopting fiscal rules seem rather uncertain, an obvious question to ask is why countries would make the executive and legislative effort to do so. This question has received very little attention in the fiscal policy literature, which is somewhat surprising given the sharp increase in the popularity of fiscal rules in recent years and policy makers' apparent interest in the feasibility of adopting them. We shed some light on this issue in this paper. Specifically, we extend the empirical literature on fiscal rules by examining the variables that have influenced countries' decision to adopt a numerical fiscal rule on the level of public debt. We draw on the fiscal deficit bias literature as well as on recent empirical studies of the impact of fiscal rules on fiscal performance to identify a variety of economic, institutional and other variables as determinants of the decision to adopt a fiscal rule. We use annual data over the period 1970-2012 for 110 countries, of which 58 opted to adopt a rule on the level of public debt. We report results from a binary choice model for the full sample of countries and separately for 'high-income ' and 'other (lower) income' countries in order to control for possible heterogeneity and institutional differences. We also control for the requirement that a country adopt a fiscal rule as stipulated in international treaties setting out the terms for membership of monetary unions, and address the issue of 'reverse causality'.
Our findings suggest that several economic, institutional and political factors affect the probability of fiscal rule adoption, and that some of them have different impacts on the probability of rule adoption depending on a country's level of development. The differences probably stem in part from the different economic characteristics of countries and the credibility of their fiscal institutions. The policy implication of the study is that countries considering adopting fiscal rules need to improve their performance in several respects (economic, institutional and political) before deciding to do so.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews briefly the relevant literature to reveal possible determinants of the decision to adopt fiscal rules. The methodology and data are discussed in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 present the main results and some sensitivity analysis, respectively, and Section 6 concludes.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The increased usage of fiscal rules reflects concerns about a so-called deficit bias in fiscal policy that results from governments' short-sightedness and the 'common pool problem'.
1 The short-sightedness derives from governing party concerns about electoral prospects that may lead to insufficient attention being paid to longer term budgetary requirements (Persson and Svensson, 1989) , or to governments opportunistically raising spending or cutting taxes to increase their prospects for re-election (Rogoff, 1990) , or to governments raising public debt levels so as to limit future governments' room for manoeuvre in fiscal policy .
2 The common pool problem occurs because special interest groups fail to internalize the overall budgetary impact of their competing demands (Weingast et al., 1981; Velasco, 1999; Wyplosz and Kostrup, 2010) . One way to mitigate fiscal deficit bias is to adopt numerical fiscal rules that impose binding constraints on the conduct of fiscal policy. This involves setting a numerical target over some time period to guide fiscal policy, and the specification of a summary operational fiscal indicator to which the rule is applied (Kopits and Symansky, 1998) . In practice, countries adopting fiscal rules have typically opted for rules that are linked closely to debt sustainability, 3 with the most common rules specifying some measure of budget balance (overall balance, structural or cyclically adjusted balance or balance 'over the business cycle'), an explicit limit on or target for public debt, a limit on primary or current government spending or a minimum level of government revenues aimed at boosting revenue collection and/or preventing an excessive tax burden. In practice, many countries that have adopted fiscal rules have opted for more than one numerical rule, most commonly having rules pertaining to both a measure of budget balance and to the public debt ratio.
Although there is virtually no empirical literature bearing directly on the factors behind countries' decision to adopt fiscal rules, the fiscal deficit bias literature suggests a number of economic, institutional and political variables as likely to increase the probability of adoption. Most obviously, 1 See Abbas et al. (2010) for a review of long-run developments in public debt in a variety of countries.
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Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011) provide a survey of potential reasons for fiscal deficit bias.
3
In practical terms debt sustainability is generally taken to mean convergence of the public debt-to-GDP ratio to a finite level, thereby ensuring that the intertemporal budget constraint of the government is met.
this literature cites large and persistent fiscal deficits and growing public sector debt as a justification for the introduction of fiscal rules (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Debrun and Kumar, 2007) . In addition, the International Monetary Fund (2009) argues that fiscal deficit bias has coincided with decelerating real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates in many-especially advanced-economies and an increase in government spending, reflecting the involvement of governments in a growing number of economic activities and the extension of the welfare state. The higher expenditure associated with the increasing demand for public services was not always matched by a similar increase in revenues, which can be explained in part by the potential economic and electoral costs of raising an already high tax burden in an integrating world economy in which certain tax bases have become more mobile. Alesina et al. (2008) expand the fiscal deficit bias discussion to include its role in accounting for procyclical fiscal policy. They argue that rational voters do not trust corrupt governments with resources such that when voters realize that a positive income shock has hit the economy, they demand immediate benefits in the form of tax cuts or increases in government spending. They fear that otherwise the available extra resources will be 'wasted' in rents. Faced with these procyclical demands by voters, governments incur large debts even in good times. This contrasts with the more common explanation of fiscal procyclicality, which is that in bad times many governments cannot borrow, or can do so only at very high interest rates, and therefore they have to cut public spending; in booms, they can borrow more easily and choose to increase spending. Moreover, if there is substantial integration into world markets, governments will likely be more able to access external funding during cyclical downturns (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Kaminski et al., 2004; Thornton, 2007) . However, although domestic financial development and stronger integration into world markets might raise government access to domestic and external debt financing, they also subject governments to closer scrutiny of fiscal sustainability by financial market analysts and rating agencies. This strengthens the case for those governments to adopt fiscal rules that commit them to fiscal prudence and solvency. In addition, the prospect of greater access to domestic and external financing during cyclical downturns would seem to support a decision to adopt fiscal rules to minimize fiscal pro-cyclicality or strengthen fiscal counter-cyclicality. Other authors argue that the short-term strategic behaviour of political parties and the degree of government fragmentation explain fiscal deficit bias. In these contexts, the bias occurs because of the inability of governments to cut spending or raise taxes. For example, Persson and Svenson (1989) , Tabellini and Alesina (1990) and Calmfors (2005) argue that the behaviour of political parties that are likely to alternate in office can feed the deficit bias. This is because governments with little chance of being re-elected may be tempted to run deficits and accumulate debt so as to prevent future governments from engaging in ambitious programs or in activities inconsistent with the priorities of the government currently in power. The larger the probability of an electoral defeat for the government in power and the larger the difference in preferences between parties, the larger the deficit bias may be.
A number of studies stress the influence of voting rules and political systems on fiscal deficit bias. For example, Poterba (1994) and Besley and Case (1995) conclude that in the United States, political fragmentation is associated with higher spending across states. Roubini and Sachs (1989) report results from a panel of industrial countries suggesting that more fragmented governments tend to run larger deficits. Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) find that in OECD countries government expenditure and debt are positively correlated with the number of members of government coalitions and with the number of spending ministries. More recently, Fabrizio and Mody (2006) show that in a sample of Eastern European countries fragmented government coalitions are associated with larger deficits, and Grilli et al. (1991) and Persson (2002) suggest that coalition governments tend to be weaker than single-party majority governments and have greater difficulty in reaching consensus on fiscal policy. As political instability of governments makes it difficult to pre-commit to rules, fiscal rules are more likely to be adopted under conditions of government stability. Several studies also suggest that social polarization can lead to populist fiscal policies and poor macroeconomic performance (e.g. Berg and Sachs, 1988; Kaufman and Stallings, 1991; Rodrik, 1996; Woo, 2005) . This suggests that governments in highly socially fragmented economies might seek to adopt fiscal responsibility rules as a means of containing the associated fiscal pressures.
Beyond the fiscal deficit bias literature, several empirical studies point to variables likely to influence the decision to adopt fiscal rules. Combes et al. (2014) report that interactions between fiscal rules and inflation targets are important for policy outcomes with countries that combine fiscal rules and inflation targets delivering more disciplined macroeconomic policies than each of these institutions in isolation. Minea and Villieu (2009) develop a theoretical model whereby inflation targeting provides an incentive for governments to improve institutional quality in order to enhance tax revenue performance. Testing of this model by Lucotte (2012) , using propensity score matching, indicates that inflation targeting has a significant positive effect on public revenue collection in a sample of 13 emerging economies. These studies suggest that having an inflation-targeting regime already in place is a factor likely to influence the decision to adopt fiscal rules.
The International Monetary Fund (2009) argues that fiscal rules should not be introduced in an excessively uncertain economic environment because this can complicate the establishment of an appropriate fiscal target as well as the implementation of policies to attain it. Their analysis suggests that low real GDP growth, increasing public debt and large currency depreciations were all associated with a lower probability of introducing a fiscal rule. These authors also report evidence that fiscal rules tend to be introduced in countries that have already made progress in achieving fiscal and economic stability.
In addition, fiscal rules help reduce uncertainty as to future government actions and may contribute to policy coordination. Two particular examples are the degree of fiscal decentralization and the choice of exchange rate regime. In the case of the former, there is a substantial literature on fiscal federalism that attests to important differences in the conduct and outcome of fiscal policy between federal and unitary countries, with decentralized fiscal systems often inducing sub-national governments to spend inefficiently and beyond their means (e.g. Prud'homme, 1995; Webb, 2004; Feld and Schnellenbach, 2010) . Thus, national governments in countries with more fiscal decentralization might be more likely to adopt fiscal rules to strengthen their bargaining position with respect to regional authorities. As regards, the exchange rate regime, the literature that links the choice of exchange rate regime to fiscal performance, focuses on the impact of government deficits and public debt levels on the relative success of fixed, intermediate and floating exchange rates. The conventional view (e.g. Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988; Frenkel et al., 1991, among others) is that pegs are associated with more fiscal discipline than are floats. If governments adopt a lax fiscal policy under a fixed exchange rate, it could lead to a speculative attack on reserves and, consequently, result in currency devaluation. Because the eventual collapse of the peg would imply a large political cost for the policy maker, fixed regimes impose discipline on fiscal authorities. 4 This suggests that countries favouring fixed exchange rate regimes would be more likely to adopt fiscal rules. In addition, Bova et al. (2014) find that fiscal rules were adopted either as part of the toolkit to join currency unions or to strengthen fiscal frameworks during and after large stabilization and policy reform episodes. Schaechter et al. (2012) discuss the role of fiscal rules in countries that are members of currency unions as the regional costs of fiscal discipline may not be internalized by national governments.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL
We test for factors that increase the probability that a fiscal rule will be adopted as follows. During each year, a country chooses either to adopt a fiscal rule or to continue implementing an alternative (non-fiscal rule) fiscal strategy. We therefore employ a panel binary response model where the dependent variable yit (i = 1, . . . N; t = 1, . . . T) is a dummy that takes the value 1 if a country i adopted a fiscal rule in year t, and 0 otherwise. 5 As there 4 However, political economy arguments provide the opposite rationale. Tornell and Velasco (2000) argue that exchange rate pegs postpone the costs of unsustainable fiscal policy (devaluation and inflation) into the future by relying on lower international reserves in the short term. 5 See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Baltagi (2008). are unobserved characteristics, the appropriate specification is a panel probit model with random effects that is estimated using maximum likelihood. The estimation of a fixed-effects model faces the incidental parameters problem as the number of parameters to be estimated increases with the number of countries in the sample (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 484) . However, there is no fixed-effects probit estimator that can deal with this problem. Although fixed-effects logit solves the incidental parameters problem, it drops all observations for countries that do not change fiscal strategy in the period analysed-i.e. observations for which ni yit
0 are excluded from the log-likelihood function (Wooldridge, 2002) . Accordingly, we do not estimate a fixed-effects model.
Our general model is:
where yit = 1 if y it * > 0, yit = 0 if y it * ≥ 0; y it * is an unobserved latent variable that describes the decision to adopt a fiscal rule; α is a constant term; β, γ and η are vectors of parameter estimates; μi is the unobserved random effect, uncorrelated with explanatory variables; εit is a normally, independently and identically distributed error term with mean 0 and variance 1; and ECi,t−i, INSi,t−i and STABi,t−i are explanatory variables. Following common practice, we include the 1-year lag of the explanatory variables to avoid potential endogeneity. The probability of adopting a fiscal rule is given as:
where Φ(.) is a standard normal cumulative distribution function. Because consistent cross-country data on public sector debt is more readily available than data on fiscal balances, we focus on the factors influencing a country's decision to adopt a numerical rule on the stock of public debt. For information on the dates of adoption of the rule, we draw on International Monetary Fund (2009) and Schaechter et al. (2012) . Our data panel comprises annual data for 110 countries over the period 1970-2012, 58 of which adopted a rule constraining the level of public debt and the remaining countries chose not to adopt such a rule. Table 1 lists the debt rule adopting countries and the year they adopted the rule (panel A), and lists the countries without a debt rule (panel B). 6 The growth in the number of 6
In total, International Monetary Fund (2009) and Schaechter et al. (2012) document that 69 countries adopted a numerical rule on the level of public rules over the period 1970-2012, but 11 of these countries are excluded from our panel because of insufficient economic and institutional data. Similarly, data constraints mean that not all countries without a debt rule are included in the sample. countries adopting a numerical rule on the level of public debt is illustrated in Fig. 1 . It shows that adoption became particularly popular from the late 1990s, which substantially reflected the rule-based fiscal framework of the European Union's Stability and Growth Pact enacted in 1997. Table 2 provides a description of the variables and the data sources. The explanatory variables that we include are drawn from the discussion in Section 2 and are as follows. The economic variables (ECi,t−1) include the ratio of public sector debt to GDP, the annual rate of inflation, annual real GDP growth, per capita GDP, 7 and economic openness, which is represented by the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP and the Chinn and Ito (2008) index of capital account openness. The public debt data are from Abbas et al. (2010) and the economic series are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) database. The institutional factors (INSi,t−1) include having an inflation target in place at the time a fiscal rule was adopted (a 0-1 dummy), the dates for which are taken from Hammond (2012) ; the degree of exchange rate flexibility represented by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) , which ranks regimes from 1 (least flexible) to 5 (most flexible); the level of financial development, which is represented by the ratio of bank credit to the private sector to GDP (Beck et al., 2010) and is from the WDI database; and the 7 Given the wide diversity in the levels of economic development of countries in the sample, we control for per capita GDP. One rationale for this is that governments in more developed economies have more human and economic resources available to undertake the task of adopting, complying with, monitoring and evaluating the operation of a fiscal rule. 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 degree of fiscal decentralization, which is the Ivanyna and Shah (2014) index that ranks decentralization on a scale from 0 (least decentralized) to 1 (most decentralized). Finally, the indicators of political stability and social polarization (STABi,t−1) are the Banks and Wilson (2014) composite measure of political instability (PINSTAB), which is a weighted average of conflict measures (assassinations, strikes, guerrilla warfare, government crises, purges, riots, revolutions and anti-government demonstrations) in a country (with an increase in the series indicating greater political instability), and the Alesina et al. (2003) index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, which measures the likelihood that any two randomly selected individuals in a country will not Number of other countries with a debt rule in place in the year that a country adopts a debt rule. Fund (2009) belong to the same ethno-linguistic group (with the value of the index increasing with the number of ethnic groups in a country). A correlation matrix of the variables (Appendix Table A1 ) reveals very low correlation coefficients between all of them, which suggest that multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue for the estimations. Table 3 presents the mean comparison tests of the explanatory variables for countries that did and did not adopt a debt rule. The results suggest statistically significant differences in average experience between the two country groups. In particular, the countries that eventually adopted a debt rule had higher levels of public debt, more developed financial markets, more stable exchange rate regimes and more political stability than those countries that did not adopt a rule, but that they had experienced lower inflation, were less integrated into the international economy and were less decentralized.
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS
As a first step, we applied panel unit root tests to check for the stationarity of the explanatory variables. The results (not reported) suggest that most variables are stationary. 8 The results from estimating a panel probit model with robust (White-corrected) standard errors for the full sample of countries are reported in Table 4 . We also included (0-1) dummy variables in the estimates to capture regional differences (Latin America, Asian and Africa) but do not report the coefficient for reasons of parsimony. As coefficient estimates in 8 The panel unit root test results are available from the authors on request. probit cannot be interpreted directly, we report the average marginal effects.
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We begin with results from a baseline model including all economic, institutional and political variables in the decision to adopt a debt rule. These results are reported in column 1 and indicate that a country is more likely to adopt a debt rule if it has a high level of public debt, if inflation and GDP growth are relatively low, if it is open to international trade, if fiscal arrangements are decentralized, if the exchange rate regime is relatively inflexible, if it has an 9 Average marginal effects are computed as averages of individual marginal effects. The standard errors of marginal effects are calculated using the delta method (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) . inflation targeting regime in place and if its credit markets are deep; ethnic fractionalization and political stability do not appear to be significant factors in the decision. In column 2, we report results that control for the 'popularity effect' of adopting a debt rule. In other words, we try to gauge whether the fact that other countries have adopted a rule is a significant factor encouraging countries that have not done so to also adopt one. To this end, we add an explanatory variable that counts the number of countries that had adopted a debt rule until year t. The coefficient on the popularity effect variable is statistically significant and positive, suggesting that countries tend to adopt a rule after observing that others have chosen this fiscal strategy. However, in this model the coefficients on inflation and GDP growth lose statistical significance while that on capital account openness is significant and suggests that more open economies are less likely to adopt a debt rule. In many countries in our sample, debt rules are based on international treaties stemming from membership of a monetary union, which might be expected to impact on the relative importance of factors in the decision to adopt a rule. Monetary union membership in the sample includes 18 euro area countries, six Central African CFA franc zone countries, eight West African franc zone countries and six Eastern Caribbean dollar zone countries. We examine this influence by creating a 0-1 dummy variable to indicate membership of a monetary union (with 0 indicating years before monetary union membership and 1 indicating years after) and estimating panel probit models in which the dummy variable is interacted with capital account and trade account openness, fiscal decentralization and the presence of an inflation targeting framework. These results are presented in columns 3-6 of the table. Two points stand out. First, the signs on the coefficients of the interacted variables are all positive and statistically significant, suggesting that membership of a monetary union strengthened the impact of capital and trade account openness, fiscal decentralization and an inflation-targeting framework on the decision to adopt a rule. Second, the coefficients on capital account openness (column 3) and trade openness (column 4) are negative in the presence of the interaction terms but the size of the coefficients on the interaction terms are much larger such that the sum of the two coefficients is positive. That is, the impact of capital and trade account openness on the likelihood of adopting a debt rule depends crucially on whether a country is a member of a monetary union.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In this section we examine the sensitivity of our results to country income classifications, and address further the potential problem of reverse causality. In the first case, we split the sample into 'high-income' and the 'other (lower) income' countries using the country classification system of the World Bank. 10 The assumption is that these two groups of countries have different economic and institutional characteristics and as such may have different fiscal policy objectives. Generally, governments in high-income countries enjoy more policy credibility and have not faced (at least until recently) serious difficulties in achieving fiscal sustainability. In contrast, lower income economies often suffer from limited credibility of fiscal policy and may adopt fiscal rules to both anchor fiscal policy and increase policy credibility. The results for the separate country samples are reported in Table 5 . In several respects there is little difference between the two sets of results, with countries in both groups more likely to adopt a debt rule if public debt is high, the exchange rate regime is relatively inflexible, an inflation targeting regime is in place and credit markets are deep. There are differences in other respects, however. First, the level of economic development (GDP per capita) is statistically significant in both groups of countries but it plays a different role in each, with richer countries in the high-income group less likely to adopt a rule, whereas richer countries in the lower income group are more likely to do so. The former finding seems inconsistent with the assertion by The International Monetary Fund (2009)-that fiscal rule adoption is less likely in poor economic performers-i.e. our results suggest that rule adoption is less likely in good economic performers, at least to the extent that per capita GDP is an indicator of economic performance. It might also reflect the fact that the highest income countries have credible fiscal frameworks in place that do not need to be supplemented by a numerical rule. In contrast, the wealthier countries among the lower income group might favour fiscal rule adoption to improve the credibility of their fiscal frameworks; per capita GDP might be signalling institutional capability, with only the highest income countries in this group having the capability to develop and enforce a debt rule. A second difference between the two groups of countries is in the impact of the openness of the economy on the decision to adopt a debt rule. For the high-income countries, the more open of them are more likely to adopt a debt rule, while for the lower income countries the more open are less likely to do so, perhaps reflecting a wish to avoid scrutiny by financial market analysts and rating agencies of fiscal performance with respect to the rule. A third difference is that fiscal decentralization appears to be a factor in the decision to adopt a rule only in the lower income group, suggesting that in this group of countries there is a greater need for national governments to strengthen bargaining positions on fiscal issues with respect to regional authorities. Finally, membership of monetary unions plays a more important role in the decision to adopt a debt rule in the high-income country group, where the coefficients on the interaction terms are always positive and statis- 
Notes:
The table reports average marginal effects and their robust standard errors (in parenthesis).
***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.
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tically significant. In the lower income group sample, only the coefficient on the fiscal decentralization interaction term is statistically significant, with result suggesting that the importance of fiscal decentralization in the decision to adopt a debt rule stems solely from obligations as the result of monetary union membership.
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Our second sensitivity test also aims at dealing further with the issue of 'reverse causality'. The adoption of fiscal rules often come as part of a broader change in fiscal and other institutions-e.g. as part of a fiscal devolution reform or a change in a country's monetary regime. In this regard, the International Monetary Fund (2009) notes that fiscal rule adoption often follows other institutional changes by several years. In such cases, there might be omitted variables contained within the error term that explain fiscal rule adoption and are correlated with many of the decision variables we employ. If this is the case, it seems likely that the estimates of equation (2) will be biased and inconsistent. The challenge is to find instruments that create exogenous variation in the right-hand side variables but are not directly correlated with fiscal rule adoption or the error term. In the estimates reported in Tables 4 and 5 , we sought to address the issue of causality by lagging all the right-hand side variables by 1 year. In Table 6 , we report results from two additional checks. First, we employ a panel logit estimate in which the focus is exclusively on the factors leading to fiscal rule adoption, and all observations for a country are dropped after the rule has been adopted. The logic here is that the decision to adopt a rule is based on information available to the fiscal authority at the moment the decision is taken-what happens afterwards is not relevant for the decision to adopt a rule. This procedure avoids potential reverse causality and endogeneity problems that might arise using explanatory variables that refer to the postadoption period. 12 The result is reported in column 1 of the table and substantially supports the baseline results reported in Table 4 . The main differences are that ethnic fractionalization and political instability also appear to be factors taken into account in the decision to adopt a debt rule-such a rule being less likely to be adopted the more ethnically diverse and less politically stable the country. Second, we follow Arellano and Bover (1995) and use system GMM estimation in which lagged levels and lagged differences of the dependent variables are used as instruments. This result is reported in column 2 of Table 6 . It also supports the baseline results and suggests that lagged public debt has a large, positive and statistically signifi-11 Note that Table 5 does not report results from an estimate that includes an interaction between monetary union membership and an inflation targeting regime being in place, as the relevant monetary union central banks did not target inflation. 12 A referee pointed out that a potential problem with this approach is that much of the sample includes no-rule cases and that the weight of the investigation rests on the last year observations; nonetheless, we believe that the approach is a useful check against potential reverse causality issues.
cant impact on the adoption of a fiscal rule, with the size of the estimated coefficient of lagged public debt implying that the importance of the righthand side variables does not increase much over time. In this result, the basic assumption of no second-order serial correlation is satisfied, and the Sargan test of over-identification restrictions approves the validity of the instruments.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper examined the factors leading to the decision of countries to adopt a fiscal rule to limit the growth of public sector debt. Although there is little In these estimates, all observations for a country are dropped after the adoption of the fiscal rule. b SysGMM = system GMM, Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z = −0.53. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. direct empirical evidence on the issue, the literature on the 'fiscal deficit bias' and the studies on the design and institutional issues relating to fiscal rules and their macroeconomic effects suggest a number of economic, institutional, political and social factors likely to be taken into account. We use a large sample of countries to investigate the relevance of different variables. Our findings suggest that the probability of a country adopting a debt rule is greater if it has a high level of public debt, if the exchange rate regime is relatively inflexible, if it already has an inflation targeting regime in place and its credit markets are deep. There also appears to be a significant 'popularity effect' in the adoption of a debt rule, with countries tending to adopt them after observing that other countries have done so. Finally, membership of a monetary union appears to strengthen the impact of capital and trade account openness, fiscal decentralization and an inflation-targeting framework on the decision to adopt a fiscal rule.
The results from the full sample of countries mask some differences between high-income and lower income countries in the factors leading to adoption of a debt rule. The stock of public debt, the exchange rate regime, an inflation targeting regime and the depth of credit markets remain important decision factors for both groups of countries. However, the level of economic development and the openness of the economy play opposite roles in each country group and the impact of monetary unions on debt rule adoption is much stronger in the high-income group of countries. Finally, our results are robust to testing for reverse causality, including using different econometric techniques. Our results imply that countries considering adopting fiscal rules in the future need to prepare well by improving aspects of their macroeconomic performance and institutional frameworks, and to assure the presence of supporting monetary and other policy frameworks. 
